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1 Introduction
The incentives that firms have to merge have recently been studied in non-cooperative
games of endogenous coalition formation. The usual way of analyzing these games is by
assuming that the forming of a coalition or the negotiation of a merger has no cost for the
participants, in particular, many players may consider simultaneously whether to form a
coalition or not.
This paper explores incentives to merge when only bilateral agreements are feasible at
every point in time. This restriction does not mean, however, that only small coalitions
may be formed. By sequentially meeting over time, coalitions may grow in size. In other
words, once some coalitions are formed, they may decide to continue with the process and
form even larger entities.
The sector of firms that provide professional services (accounting, consulting, etc.)
offers a relevant set of examples of such a sequential process of mergers. Some of the
major firms in this sector, (i.e., Ernst & Young, KPGM and PricewaterhouseCoopers) are
the outcome of a sequential process of mergers with a small number of parties involved.
In particular, since Arthur Young opened an accounting firm in Chicago (1894), and the
brothers Alvin and Theodore Ernst settled their firm in Cleveland (1903), at least four
bilateral mergers have taken place before the present structure of Ernst and Young was
arrived at.
The banking sector provides other examples. In Spain, the bank that is now known as
SCH is the outcome of a merger between the Banco de Santander and the Banco Central
Hispano which, in turn, was the result of the merger between the banks Central and
Hispano. Similarly, the banks of Bilbao and Vizcaya first merged to form the BBV and
then the new firm merged again with the Banco Argentaria to form the BBVA.
We model the formation of coalitions as a sequential process in which, at each moment
in time, only two existing coalitions can decide to merge. We study the subgame perfect
equilibria of such a game. The sequential process of coalition formation that we propose
can be useful in analyzing sequential formation of bilateral agreements in several economic
environments where groups of agents interact, including mergers, environmental cartels,
and networks.
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In this paper, we consider a market in which identical firms with constant returns
facing linear demand compete à la Cournot. At each period, the firms make decisions
on quantity. To focus our analysis on the incentives to form coalitions, we assume that
production is a short-term decision. Also, at each period, two randomly chosen coalitions
can merge in the existing partition. A merger means forming a cartel in which the partners
decide on production jointly. The decision on the merger is made by taking the long-term
profits into account.
As Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) point out, two firms (or coalitions) will not
be interested in merging if they only consider the present period profits and if there are
already at least three firms (coalitions) in the industry. Their result extends easily to our
model: If the firms’ discount rate is low enough, they will not merge at any period in the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Hence, the outcome is that all of the
firms remain singletons.
The situation when firms are forward-looking is more interesting. In such a case, the
firms may want to merge even if they lose profits in the short run. In fact, we show
that when firms are patient enough, and there are enough firms in the industry, the
final outcome of any subgame perfect equilibria is “the grand coalition”. The firms form
coalitions sequentially, growing gradually, so that finally they all end up together. We
characterize the sequences of mergers that the firms will undertake in equilibrium. In
those sequences, firms will accept some of the mergers and will reject others.
The fact that, in a linear Cournot model, “the grand coalition” can result as the
equilibrium of a game of coalition formation, is in contrast with other results on mergers
presented in the literature. Interestingly, it is the fact that only a pair of coalitions can
merge at each period (so bigger coalitions cannot be formed immediately) which allows
them to reach “the grand coalition”. Even if this restriction to bilateral agreements is
ex-ante damaging to the formation of coalitions, since it reduces the choice set of the
firms, it ex-post results in an impulse for the process of merging. The reason for this is
that the bilateral nature of the mergers induces the coalitions to be formed gradually, in
such a way that the incentives for all of the players to “free ride” are always outweighed
by the future benefits of the mergers.
Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999), also analyze an infinite-horizon sequential
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game. In their model, payoffs are only realized after the coalitions have been formed. In
the coalition formation game previous to the production, the first agent, according to a rule
of order, makes an offer to other agents to join him in a coalition. If all members accept
the offer, the partnership is formed and the partners in the coalition leave the game. The
first agent in the set of remaining players then makes a partnership proposal, and the game
continues following the same rule until all of the players have left the game. If someone
rejects, he will then have to make the next proposal. This model applies to general
games. For the linear Cournot game, Bloch (1996) proves that, when players are ex-ante
symmetric and the discount rate is high enough, the coalition structures that result from
the stationary symmetric perfect equilibria in pure strategies contain a coalition whose
size is about 80% of the market, while the other firms remain isolated. Hence, “the grand
coalition” is not formed, since some individual firms are able to appropriate the positive
externalities generated by the large coalition, while the firms in the large coalition are
better-off inside than outside the coalition.
There are three main differences between the game proposed by Bloch (1996), and
by Ray and Vohra (1999) and our proposal. First, in their games, a player may make
an offer to any set of partners. Secondly, if the offer is accepted, the coalition leaves the
game. And thirdly, production takes place only after the coalitions have been formed.
This third difference, however, is not relevant. In the last section of the paper, we propose
a variation of our game in which firms only produce after the coalition-formation game
has been played. We verify that our results hold in this environment as well. We also
show that our analysis can be easily adapted to cope with situations in which the identity
of the firms or coalitions that can merge at any given period is not random but follows a
deterministic protocol. On the other hand, the fact that a player may propose a merger
to any set of players, and that any coalition that is formed leaves the game and will not
be approached again by any proposer, are key features of the model by Bloch, and the
one by Ray and Vohra. We show that when players who form coalitions do not leave the
game, and the coalition formed at a given period may have any size, “the grand coalition”
is just one outcome of the game, but many other outcomes may arise in equilibrium.1
1Note that this is the only interesting alternative since if players meet two by two and leave the game
when a merge occurs, only very particular outcomes may arise in equilibrium.
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Note, also, that the characteristics of our game allow us to analyze all of the subgame
perfect equilibria, without restricting our attention to stationary strategies. All the results
remain true if we concentrate on the stationary subgame perfect equilibria of our coalition
formation game.
In the literature on mergers, several authors have addressed the question of the coali-
tion structures that would prevail in Cournot games with homogenous goods and linear
demand by analyzing the stability of the coalition structures.2 This literature suggests
that there would eventually be one large coalition and a few players as singletons. Our
game never has these intermediate results: If there is a small number of players, or if the
discount rate is low, all of the players remain as singletons, while “the grand coalition”
is the only final outcome when both the set of players and the discount rate are large
enough. In fact, “all singletons” and “the grand coalition” are the only two possible
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of our game.
Some authors have considered the sequential formation of mergers by studying how
merger decisions are inter-connected over time. Pesendorfen (2000) considers a model of
merger formation in the line of Kamien and Zang (1990), where certain firms acquire oth-
ers by submitting bids and asking prices. Pesendorfen (2000) allows for entry and shows
that some mergers may be more profitable if future mergers are expected. In his model,
“the grand coalition” cannot be formed in a single period, not because agreements by a
fixed number of firms are allowed, but because all the firms are not present in the mar-
ket from the beginning of the game. He concludes that even if frequent mergers are not
profitable when the number of firms in the industry is small, they can become profitable
as the number of firms increases. Gowrisankaran (1999) considers a dynamic model in
which mergers arise endogenously. He focuses on the dynamic links between the process
2In simultaneous games, we can refer to four stability concepts (Aumann (1967) and Hart and Kurtz
(1983)). A coalition structure is α-stable if no group of firms can guarantee an improvement, indepen-
dently of what the others do. A partition is β-stable if no group of firms has, for any possible reaction of
the external players, a strategy that can improve its situation. A coalition structure is γ-stable (respec-
tively, δ-stable) if no set of players has incentives to deviate when the players of their original coalitions
split up (respectively, they still form a coalition). In the linear Cournot game, α-stable, β-stable, and
γ-stable outcomes always have the form {s, 1, ..., 1} with s being higher or equal to 80% of the market.
The set of δ-stable outcomes, on the other hand, is empty.
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of endogenous mergers and the decisions on production, entry, exit and investment. The
complexity of the game forces him to solve it numerically. In spite of this, the model
provides interesting insights into the dynamic interaction between the different firm’s de-
cisions. Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2000) analyze the steady states of an endogenous
merger game, in which a dominant firm takes merger decisions regarding a competitive
fringe. They assess the importance of the different elasticities (both of supply and de-
mand), as well as the alternative discount factor, on the evolution of the market. They
show that monopoly and perfect competition always belong to the set of steady states in
the game.3
Our work is not only in line with the literature that analyzes the formation or stability
of coalition structures in Cournot games, but also with Gul (1989), author analyzes a
transferable utility economy in which random bilateral meetings occur. At each meeting,
one of the agents makes a proposal to the other which he can either accept or reject. If
the proposal is accepted, the resources of both agents are in the hands of the proposer
from this moment on, otherwise, both players stay in the game. Gul (1989) shows that,
under some conditions, all the players will eventually end up together and the expected
payoff of each player in an efficient sequential perfect equilibrium is his Shapley value.4
In the following section we present the coalition-formation game. In Section 3, we
analyze the outcomes of the game when firms are myopic, while in Section 4 we do the
analysis when firms are forward looking. In Section 5, we show how our results can be
extended to several variations of our game.
3Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) focus on sequential merger decisions by two disjoint groups of firms that
are exogenously fixed. They study how a merger may encourage or discourage other mergers in the future.
4Seidmann and Winter (1998) also analyze gradual coalition-formation in games without externalities,
although the agreements are not bilateral. Other papers that study coalition-formation in characteristic
function games are: Chatterjee et al. (1993), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), and Okada (1996). They
all use stationary subgame perfect equilibrum as solution concept given that the set of subgame perfect
equilibria in multilateral bargaining problems, as the ones they study, is typically very large.
6
2 The Coalition-Formation Game
We study the sequential formation of coalitions between firms competing à la Cournot
in a framework in which only bilateral agreements are allowed. We assume that, at each
moment in time only two of the existing coalitions can decide to merge.
At the beginning of the game, there are n identical firms, with n ≥ 2. We denote the
set of firms by N = {1, ..., n}. Firms can form coalitions following a certain protocol that
will be described later. Hence, at any point in time, these n firms form a partition of N ,
i.e., they constitute a coalition structure.
Let
Q
denote the set of coalition structures over N. Denote π ∈
Q
an element of this
set, that is, π = {S1, ..., Sr}, with Sa ⊂ N for all a = 1, ..., r, ∪ra=1Sa = N, and Sa∩Sb = ∅
for all Sa, Sb ∈ π, with Sa 6= Sb. We denote by sa the size of coalition Sa. Among the
set of partitions, a particular coalition structure is the one in which all the agents are
alone, i.e., all the coalitions are singletons. We denote such a partition by πn and “the
grand coalition” by π1 ≡ N , i.e., the coalition structure with just one element. We denote
by (π\{Sa, Sb}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb}, the coalition structure that results when we replace two
elements of π, namely Sa and Sb, by their union. Therefore, if π is formed by r coalitions,
(π\{Sa, Sb}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} consists of (r − 1) coalitions.
Firms make decisions at any time t = 0, 1, 2, .... At time t, the present profits of a
firm depend on the whole coalition structure that is formed at that time. We assume, for
the sake of simplicity, that firms face a linear demand function and bear equal constant
average costs. That is, the inverse demand function at time t is:
P (
nX
j=1
qj) = α− β
nX
j=1
qj.
The production costs of firm i are given by:
Ci(qi) = cqi.
When firms merge, they form a cartel. That is, merging allows the firms to co-ordinate
their quantity decisions. We calculate the firms’ profits at any point in time, given a cartel
structure (i.e., a coalition structure) π = {S1, ..., Sr}. We assume that production is a
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short-term decision, being taken by short-term managers.5 Given that there are r cartels
in this structure and that marginal costs are equal for all firms in a cartel, cartel Sa
chooses the total level of production qa of its firms by solving the following maximization
program:
max
qa
(Ã
α− β
rX
b=1
qb
!
qa − cqa
)
. (1)
From this program we find that the equilibrium quantities are equal for all of the cartels
and that they are equal to: qr = α−cβ(r+1) . Hence, the Cournot profits per-cartel V
r in a
coalition structure with r cartels are:
V r =
(α− c)2
β(r + 1)2
.
We normalize (α−c)
2
β = 1, so:
V r =
1
(r + 1)2
.
It can be easily verified that the efficient outcome, from the industry’s point of view, is
arrived at when all the firms merge, and “the grand coalition” is formed.
We assume that the sharing of profits among the firms that form the cartel is exoge-
nously fixed and egalitarian. Therefore, the individual profits Vi(π) of any firm i belonging
to the cartel Sa ∈ π, with a size sa, when there are r cartels in the coalition structure π,
are:
Vi(π) =
1
(r + 1)2sa
. (2)
Firms value future payoffs with a homogeneous discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore,
if πt is the coalition structure existing at time t, for t ≥ t◦, the discounted payoff of firm
5It is well known that, in an infinite game like ours, there are strategies by which firms may reach
implicit collusion in production if the discount rate is high enough (notice, however, that the set of
equilibrium outcomes is usually very large). Our objective in this paper is the analysis of the incentives
for coalition formation, so we will abstract from the possibility of collusion by assuming that production is
a short-term decision. An equivalent assumption is that firms use Markov, or stationary, strategies when
they decide their production level. In Section 5, we analyze a simpler game in which this assumption is
not necessary because production takes place only once. In this game, all our results still hold.
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i at time t◦ is
∞P
t=t◦
δ(t−t◦)Vi(πt).6 We shall also discuss, later on, the particular case of the
players being perfectly patient (δ = 1) and evaluate future profits with the “time-average
criterion”. That is, firm i maximizes:
lim
T→∞
inf
PT
t=0 Vi(πt )
T
.
We study the outcome of a process of sequential coalition formation. This infinite-
horizon process is undertaken according to the following protocol. At each period t, there
is first the decision to merge (stages t.1 and t.2) and secondly, (stage t.3), there is the
decision on production. We have already described the result of the production stage,
summarized by the profit function Vi(πt). More precisely:
At t = 0:
0.1 Two different firms i and j are randomly selected. All the firms have the same
probability of being selected.
0.2 Firms i and j sequentially decide whether to merge or not. The merger occurs if
both players agree.
The coalition structure at time t = 0 is then either π0 = (πn\{{i}, {j}}) ∪ {i, j} if
firms i and j have merged or π0 = πn if they have not.
0.3 Each firm k ∈ N obtains, at t = 0, profits Vk (π0).
Let us now consider any time t ≥ 1. The coalition structure existing at t− 1 was πt−1.
If πt−1 = N , then πt = N. Otherwise:
t.1 Two coalitions Sa and Sb in πt−1 are randomly selected. All of the coalitions in πt−1
have the same probability of being selected.
t.2 Firms in coalitions Sa and Sb sequentially decide whether to merge. The merger is
carried-out if all of the firms in coalitions Sa and Sb agree to it.7
6When δ = 0, the discounted payoff of player i at time to is Vi(πto).
7The firms are the players of our game. When they decide on the merger, the members in Sa and Sb
do not face a co-ordination problem because they chose sequentially. Therefore, if it is optimal for all of
them, they will sequentially choose to merge. If the merger is not profitable for the firms in one of the
coalitions the merger will not happen, because one of the firms will not accept it.
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The coalition structure at time t is either πt = (πt−1\{Sa, Sb})∪{Sa∪Sb} if coalitions
Sa and Sb have merged or πt = πt−1 if they have not.
t.3 Each player k ∈ N obtains profits Vk (πt) at time t.
The solution concept that we consider is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and we con-
centrate on pure strategies. We denote the set of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in pure
strategies by SPE.
We must point out that the proposed process for the formation of coalitions is irre-
versible, in the sense that the players cannot dissolve a merger once it has been formed.
Allowing for mergers to split up enlarges the set of possible SPE considerably.
Given the irreversibility of the coalition-formation process, the game will arrive at
a situation in which the existing coalition structure at that specific period will remain
forever, with probability one. We will refer to such a coalition structure as a final coalition
structure or a final outcome. If there are SPE strategies that lead to a particular final
outcome, then we say that it is an SPE final outcome.
3 Myopic Firms
The objective of this paper is to look at the SPE final outcomes of the game of sequential
formation of coalitions. The easiest analysis is done in the simple benchmark where
players have a completely myopic behavior. This is equivalent to assuming that δ = 0,
the case in which we have the static version of our game.
If the players are myopic, the firms in two coalitions Sa and Sb in partition π will
decide to merge (if they are chosen by the protocol) at any period, if and only if:8
Vi(π) < Vi ((π\{Sa, Sb}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb}) for all i ∈ Sa ∪ Sb.
Let us suppose that the coalition structure π is formed by r ≥ 2 coalitions. Then, the
firms of Sa and Sb will want to merge and move to a structure with r − 1 coalitions if:
max
½
1
(r + 1)2sa
,
1
(r + 1)2sb
¾
<
1
r2(sa + sb)
.
8For convention, we make the implicit assumption that a player will only be willing to join a coalition
if he makes a strictly positive gain by doing so.
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Let us assume, without loss of generality, that sa ≤ sb. The condition then becomes:
1
(r + 1)2sa
<
1
r2(sa + sb)
,
or equivalently:
sa >
r2
2r + 1
sb.
Note that the previous equation implies sa > sb as long as r ≥ 3, which would be in
contradiction with our hypothesis that sa ≤ sb. Therefore, two coalitions of firms will
never be interested in merging if they only care about present profits and if there are at
least three existing coalitions in the industry. This is a well-known result in static games
that goes back to Salant et al. (1983). In addition to this, and for the case r = 2, the
previous inequality shows that two coalitions will merge to monopoly if and only if their
sizes are not very different. More precisely, the required condition is that sa > (4/5)sb,
for the case sa ≤ sb.
The previous observation implies that if there are at least three firms in the market,
the only myopic final outcome of the game of coalition formation is “all singletons”. That
is, when δ = 0 no merger will occur.
For low enough discount rates, a firm is not interested in compensating short-term
loses with long-term gains. Therefore, the myopic final outcome will also be the SPE final
outcome when the discount parameter δ is low enough. We state this result formally in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If n ≥ 3 and the discount rate δ is low enough, then the only SPE final
outcome of the process of sequential coalition-formation in the linear Cournot setting is
that all firms remain singletons.
Proof. Immediate, after the discussion for the case δ = 0.
4 Forward-Looking Firms
When firms are forward-looking, they may be interested in merging even if they lose
profits in the short run, if by doing so they anticipate higher profits in the future. A
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(non-profitable) merger by two firms or two coalitions may further other mergers. Hence,
although the initial merging firms (or coalitions) lose profits because of the first merger,
they may improve their situation later on if other mergers are carried-out.
The following proposition restricts the set of potential SPE final outcomes of the
sequential game for any discount rate. It shows that, in equilibrium, firms will surely not
start merging to end up in a coalition structure with more than one coalition.
Proposition 2 The SPE final outcome of the game of coalition formation in a Cournot
competition model is either a monopoly or “all singletons”.
Proof. We do the proof by contradiction. Let us suppose that the final outcome is
a coalition structure π formed by r coalitions, with 2 ≤ r ≤ n − 1. Denote by Sa and
Sb the last two coalitions that merged, say at period t0, with sa ≤ sb. In Section 3, we
saw that, for a firm i ∈ Sa, Vi(π) > Vi((π\{Sa ∪ Sb}) ∪ {Sa, Sb}). In addition, firms in Sa
would even get strictly higher profits if, at any period after t0, other mergers not involving
Sa take place. Therefore, for firms in Sa, the strategy of merging with Sb at t0 (leading
to the final outcome π 6= π1) is strictly dominated by the strategy of not accepting any
merger from t0 on. Therefore, the firms in Sa have a profitable deviation. Hence, no SPE
strategy profile can lead to a final outcome with r coalitions, for 2 ≤ r ≤ n− 1.
Proposition 2 shows that the process of coalition-formation in a linear Cournot model
will only begin if it leads to full integration (monopoly). Otherwise, all of the firms will
remain singletons. The reason for this result is that no pair of coalitions wants to be the
last to merge (unless the merger leads to a monopoly). In equilibrium, therefore, a merger
can only happen if the firms involved anticipate that it will be followed by another, and
yet another, until “the grand coalition” is formed.
We are now interested in finding out when the SPE final outcome of the game of
coalition-formation is a monopoly. We know that a necessary condition for a monopoly
to emerge is that the discount rate should be high enough, since no merger takes place in
equilibrium when the discount rate δ is low enough, as was shown in Proposition 1.
Given Proposition 2, we also know that two coalitions will never merge if there is not
a sequence of unions leading up to full integration. Another necessary condition for the
mergers to arise therefore, is that for every value of r, for 2 ≤ r ≤ n, there must exist a
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coalition structure with r coalitions, such that at least two of them obtain smaller profits
in this sort of structure than they would in a monopoly.
The profits of the members of a coalition of size s in a coalition structure with r cartels
are strictly smaller than their profits in a monopoly if:
1
(r + 1)2s
<
1
4n
, i.e., s >
4n
(r + 1)2
.
Given that s is a natural number, the condition can be re-written as:9
s ≥ sr ≡ int
½
4n
(r + 1)2
¾
+ 1.
Hence, in a partition with r coalitions, a necessary condition for two coalitions to merge
is that the size of each one be at least sr. This necessary condition has to be verified for
every r ≥ 2.
To formally state the conditions under which a monopoly might be the SPE outcome,
let us denote byM ≡Mn the set of sequences of coalition structures M = {πr}nr=1 such
that πn is “all singletons” and, for all r = 2, ..., n, πr−1 = (πr\{Sra, Srb}) ∪ {Sra ∪ Srb}, for
some Sra and S
r
b in πr satisfying min{sra, srb} ≥ sr.
Similarly, for any r◦ = 1, ..., n, we denote by Mr◦ the set of sequences of coalition
structures Mr
◦
= {πr}r◦r=1 such that πr◦ is any partition of N with r◦ coalitions and, for
all r = 2, ..., r◦, πr−1 = (πr\{Sra, Srb}) ∪ {Sra ∪ Srb}, for some Sra and Srb in πr satisfying
min{sra, srb} ≥ sr.
According to the previous definition,M1 = {N}. Also, if the sequence {πr}r◦r=1 ∈M r◦,
then {πr}r0r=1 ∈M r0 , for any r◦ = 1, ..., n and r0 ≤ r◦.
Proposition 3 For any n, there exists a δ¯ < 1, such that ∀δ ≥ δ¯, the SPE strategy profiles
of the process of sequential coalition-formation satisfy the following properties. Consider
a subgame in which the existing partition πr contains r coalitions:
(a) If coalitions Sa and Sb are chosen by the mechanism, the merger will not be accepted
if min{sa, sb} < sr or if (πr\{Sa, Sb}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} does not belong to any sequence of
coalitions inMr−1.
9We use int{m} to denote the integer of m ∈ R.
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(b) If πr belongs to some sequence of coalitions inMr, there are two coalitions Sa and
Sb in πr, such that the firms in Sa and Sb accept the merger if they are selected by the
mechanism.
(c) The final outcome will be a monopoly if and only if πr belongs to some sequence of
coalitions inMr. Otherwise, the final outcome will be πr.
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction over r.
(r = 2) Take any subgame where only two coalitions Sa and Sb are left, i.e., π2 = {Sa, Sb}.
In such a case, the merger of the two coalitions is N, hence it is always inM1.
(2.a) If min{sa, sb} < sr, any firm in the smallest coalition prefers to stay as a duopoly
rather than become part of a monopoly. Therefore, every SPE involves rejection of the
merger.
(2.b) If π2 belongs to some sequence of coalitions in M2, then min{sa, sb} ≥ s2. All
the firms in Sa and Sb obtain higher profits by merging. As a consequence, accepting this
merger is the only SPE strategy in this subgame.
(2.c) Immediate, after (2.a) and (2.b).
We now assume, by the induction hypothesis, that properties (a), (b), and (c) hold for
any r0 < r and we prove that they are also satisfied for r, where r = 3, ..., n.
(r) Let πr be the existing partition.
(r.a) Suppose that the coalitions Sa and Sb in πr have been chosen by the mechanism
and the firms in these coalitions must decide whether to merge or not. If the partition
(πr\{Sa, Sb}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} does not belong to any Mr−1 ∈Mr−1 then, according to the
induction hypothesis (c), the final outcome will be (πr\{Sa, Sb})∪{Sa∪Sb}. On the other
hand, if the firms in one of the coalitions choose never to merge (not necessarily the optimal
strategy, but one possibility), they obtain, from this moment on, at least the benefits that
they have under the structure πr. Given that r > 2, Vi(πr) > Vi((πr\{Sa, Sb})∪{Sa∪Sb})
for either every firm in Sa or every firm in Sb. Therefore, merging is not the optimal
strategy for any of the firms, either in Sa or in Sb.
Similarly, let us suppose that min{sa, sb} < sr. According to the induction hypothesis
(c), the final outcome will be either a monopoly or (πr\{Sa, Sb})∪ {Sa ∪Sb} if Sa and Sb
merge. In both cases, the firms of the smallest coalition will obtain lower profits than in
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πr. Hence, here also, merging is a strategy that is strictly dominated (for the firms in the
smallest coalition) by the strategy of never merging from this moment on.
(r.b) We now prove that if πr belongs to some M r ∈ Mr then the strategies of the
members of (at least) two coalitions Sa and Sb in πr will be to accept the merger if they are
selected by the mechanism. We do the proof by contradiction. If no merger happens, the
final outcome is πr. Take a pair of coalitions Sa and Sb in πr, such that min{sa, sb} ≥ sr
and (πr\{Sa, Sb})∪{Sa∪Sb} belongs to someM r−1 ∈Mr−1 (the existence of such a pair
of coalitions is guaranteed by the definition of Mr). The members of Sa and Sb obtain
higher profits in a monopoly than staying in πr, since min{sa, sb} ≥ sr. Also, a monopoly
is the final outcome if (πr\{Sa, Sb}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} is reached, given that it belongs to some
M r−1 ∈Mr−1 and the induction hypothesis (c) holds. Therefore, if δ is close enough to
1, the members of Sa and Sb strictly prefer to arrive at a monopoly after some periods
than to stay in Sa and Sb forever. They will therefore, have incentives to change their
strategy and accept the merger.
(r.c) is a direct consequence of (r.a), (r.b), and the induction hypothesis (c).
Proposition 3 gives a lot of information about SPE when the discount factor δ is high.
It provides the two main characteristics of the SPE outcome. First, in a SPE strategy
profile, the members of two randomly chosen coalitions will only decide to merge if the
resulting coalition structure belongs to some sequence M r ∈ Mr. Secondly, when it is
possible to keep the chain of coalitions in a sequence in Mr, then at least one pair of
coalitions will decide to merge. The two properties together imply that, if we start from
a partition in someMr◦, the firms will form coalitions and end up all together.
Hence, form Proposition 3 we can conclude that if the “all singletons” coalition πn
belongs to some sequence M ∈M, then a monopoly is the final outcome. Moreover, a
monopoly can only be reached through sequences inM.
The next natural question is whether the setM that we have identified exists or not.
To see that it is sometimes empty, it is sufficient to verify that it is empty for n = 3
or n = 4. The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for M to contain some
sequence of coalition structures.
Lemma 1 If n is large enough, thenM is non-empty.
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Proof. The proof proceeds as follows: First, we construct a sequence M = {πr}nr=1
by starting from “the grand coalition”, π1 = N , and splitting up one coalition each time.
Secondly, we prove that the sequence M belongs to the setM.
a) We denote by Sra and S
r
b the two coalitions that are split from πr−1, i.e., πr =
(πr−1\{Sra ∪Srb})∪{Sra, Srb} (the interpretation is that Sra and Srb are the “candidates” for
a merger if the coalition structure πr emerges).
We divide S1 = N into S2a and S
2
b with s
2
a = n− s2 and s2b = s2. From this point on,
we divide the selected coalition into two, of equal sizes, or at least as equal as possible.
For r = 3, S3a and S
3
b are obtained by dividing S
2
a in such a way that s
3
a = s
3
b =
n−s2a
2
if s2a
is even and s3a = s
3
b + 1 =
n−s2a+1
2
if s2a is odd. For r ≥ 4, we split the largest coalition in
πr−1, which corresponds to the largest coalition of those with the smallest index in πr−1.
Formally, we divide S
r
2
b if r is even, and S
r+1
2
a if r is odd (see Figure 1).
[Insert Figure 1.]
b) We relegate the proof that the sequence M, previously constructed, belongs toM
when n is large enough to the Appendix.
We denote the set of natural numbers for which the set M is non-empty by N .
According to Lemma 1, for a sequence to exist in M, the number of initial players is
crucial. In fact it can be shown that the set N contains all the numbers higher than or
equal to 37.10 Let us explain why starting with a large number of firms facilitates arriving
at a monopoly. Two coalitions must not be very different in size to be willing to merge,
but this is a requirement to be fulfilled throughout the entire sequence of mergers. If, at
any stage all of the coalitions are too similar, when two of them merge they create a great
coalition compared to the others, and the small ones may stop the process by free-riding
on the big one. With many players, there is a way of having coalitions whose sizes are
balanced enough at every stage.
To highlight the previous argument, consider the case of three firms. In order to reach
“the grand coalition”, a firm of size 2 has to merge with the a firm of size 1. This process
will, however, not be completed because the duopoly is very asymmetric. The firm alone
receives higher profits in the duopoly than the third it would obtain from the monopoly
10One can also check that N also includes 15, 22, 23, 26, 29 to 31, and 33 to 35.
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profits. Consider now, the case n = 39. For the same reason as stated before, a sequence
of mergers that leads to a duopoly with a firm of size 26 and another of size 13 will never
arrive at “the grand coalition”. However, a path yielding a duopoly with firms of sizes 21
and 18 will eventually end up as a monopoly. In the previous step (a triopoly), two firms
of sizes 10 and 11, for instance, are not too small and so they prefer to reach “the grand
coalition” than to stay in the triopoly.
The next proposition states the main result of this paper by combining Proposition 3
and Lemma 1. It shows that if n ∈ N and δ is large enough, then the firms will enter into
a sequential process of forming coalitions that will end up in the creation of a monopoly.
Proposition 4 If n ∈ N , there exists a δ¯ < 1, such that ∀δ ≥ δ¯, the final outcome of any
SPE of the process of sequential coalition-formation is “the grand coalition”.
Proof. Immediate, after Proposition 3 and Lemma 1
In our coalition-formation game, only the extreme coalition structures, “all singletons”
or “the grand coalition”, can be equilibrium outcomes. Proposition 4 shows that, when
the number of initial players is high enough and these players are patient enough, the
efficient outcome is the only equilibrium outcome. That is, under these two conditions,
the possibility of establishing bilateral agreements sequentially makes the firms merge
in such a way that they end up being a monopoly. This result is in contradiction with
previous results of merger games. Indeed, as we have discussed in the Introduction, “the
grand coalition” is often not an equilibrium (or stable) outcome and, when it is, it is not
the only one.
It is difficult to give a complete characterization of the set of SPE strategies. The
reason for this is that the members of two coalitions may have incentives to wait to merge
(even if they keep the coalition structure on a “good path”) in order to obtain short-term
profits when they know that some other coalitions will eventually start merging and lead
to a monopoly. The next proposition specifies some SPE strategies for the coalition-
formation game in the particular case of the players being perfectly patient (δ = 1).
Proposition 5 If firms evaluate future profits according to the “time-average criterion”,
then the following strategy profile is a SPE profile in the game of coalition formation:
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At any period at which the members of the coalitions Sa and Sb in partition πr have to
chose whether to merge or not, they will merge if and only if min{sa, sb} < sr and the
resulting partition (πr\{Sa, Sb}) ∪ {Sa ∪ Sb} belongs to some sequence of coalitions in
Mr−1.
Proof. Straightforward, after the proof of Proposition 3.
Note that the above-stated equilibrium strategy profile is symmetric. Moreover, it is
stationary. As we have pointed out in the Introduction, our results remain valid if we
only allow for stationary SPE strategies.
5 Comments and Extensions
In this paper, we have shown that when the initial number of firms is large enough and they
are forward-looking, a sequential process of bilateral agreements will lead to the creation of
a monopoly (“the grand coalition”). In this section, we discuss the main ingredients of our
model by proposing several processes of gradual agreements. We introduce modifications
that affect the timing of the coalition formation and the production stages, the protocol
that chooses the candidates for mergers, the exogenous sharing rule, and the bilateral
nature of the agreements.
5.1 Timing of the Production Stage
Let us consider the case where production takes place and profits are realized only after
the whole process of coalition formation has ended. This is the framework that most
models in the literature have considered.11 The difference between this game and the one
described in Section 2 is that, in the latter, production takes place at every period, while
in the former, it is only undertaken once the coalition-formation stage has finished. In
fact, this variant makes the analysis simpler.
To adapt our model to this framework, let us assume the same protocol for coalition-
formation as before. Staying in the process of coalition-formation is costly, since players
discount future payoffs. Firms, hence, can decide to end the coalition formation stage
11See Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1999), and Montero (1999).
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and move to the production stage if they wish. We consider the following natural rule
to allow the firms to quit the coalition-formation stage: “at the beginning of each round,
firms are asked sequentially whether to move to the production stage, or to continue with
the coalition-formation process. The formation of coalitions continues only if all the firms
agree to it.”
In this set-up, all of our results still hold. In fact, the coalition formation process is
fostered in this framework, since the absence of intermediate payoffs reduces the possibility
of free-riding. Moreover, the equilibrium players’ strategies are easier to characterize. For
example, in the result that would parallel Proposition 3, firms will all decide to merge if
and only if such decision minimizes the expected losses from discounting. Notice that,
in this case, all the firms share the same objective function when they decide whether to
merge or not. Finally, the players’ strategies when the existing coalition structure is πr,
specify that they will decide to move to the production stage if and only if πr does not
belong to any sequence of coalitions inMr.
5.2 Protocol
Another feature of our coalition-formation game which is not crucial for obtaining the
results, is the random choice of the coalitions that are chosen in any given period. If a
deterministic protocol selects the identity of the two coalitions that can merge, the results
still hold, provided that the protocol is exhaustive in the set of possible couples for each
coalition structure (i.e., all the possible pairs of coalitions in any coalition structure are
called by the protocol at some moment).
The analysis is equally robust in scenarios where the protocol selects (either randomly
or deterministically) one of the coalitions, which then has the possibility to offer a merger
to any other coalition. Finally, we can also consider situations in which a particular
player is in charge of naming, at each period, the two coalitions that may merge. In this
case, at the SPE of the game with a high level of patience, “the grand coalition” will be
attained through the sequence of mergers that is most favorable to such a player. The
same happens if, for example, the coalitions that decide whether to merge or not at time
t are chosen by some player belonging to one of the coalitions selected at time t− 1.
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5.3 Endogenous Sharing Rule
We have chosen to study the outcomes of a coalition formation procedure when the payoffs
of the players, at any moment, depend exclusively on the coalition structure prevailing at
that moment. Indeed, we have assumed an exogenous equal-sharing rule that is indepen-
dent of the history. We could also study the outcomes of a similar procedure allowing for
endogenous sharing rules that would depend on the bargaining power of the coalitions at
the moment when they have to decide whether to merge or not. Although it may seem at
first sight that allowing for endogenous sharing rules should help the formation of coali-
tions, since it allows for compensating players in any way, this possibility makes forming
coalitions more difficult. The reason for this is that merging at an early stage lowers the
bargaining power of the players in the continuation of the game. Hence, although the
final mergers are easier to implement, the players have no incentive to start the process.
The SPE outcome of the linear Cournot game with endogenous sharing rule is that
all the players remain as singletons. To illustrate this result, consider a variation of our
coalition formation game in which, of the two coalitions that have to decide whether to
merge or not, one of them is chosen randomly and must make a proposal to the other
concerning the sharing of the surplus. In expected terms, the possible surplus will be
shared equally between the two coalitions (not necessarily equally among the firms, since
the coalitions can be of different sizes). Imagine a situation where all the players have
been merging continually until the structure in the market is of three coalitions. The sum
of the payoffs of the firms in each of the coalitions is 1/16. If a duopoly is formed, the two
coalitions will have incentives to merge, each eventually obtaining an expected payoff of
1/8, since they share the benefits of the monopoly, i.e., 1/4. But this implies that no two
coalitions in a triopoly will have any incentive to merge, forming first a duopoly in which
their join profits decrease, to end up obtaining the same profit. Note that this argument is
independent of the size of the existing coalitions, which is not true in the game proposed
in our paper where the two smallest coalitions in a triopoly may have incentives to merge.
20
5.4 Multilateral Agreements
The bilateral nature of the agreements is a key feature of our analysis. The results obtained
in this paper do not extend if the players have the possibility of forming coalitions of any
size in a single round.
Consider the following variant of our coalition formation game. At each period t, one
of the existing coalitions Sa in πt is randomly chosen. The firms in Sa choose any set
of potential partners. That is, they select any subset Z of πt such that Sa ∈ Z. All
of the firms in Z sequentially decide whether to accept the offer or not. The merger is
formed if all the firms agree on it, otherwise the same coalition structure remains until
period t+1. Other than this modification, the coalition formation and production game is
undertaken under the rules described in Section 2. Recall that this is the game proposed
in Bloch (1996), with the difference that production takes place at each and every period
(as discussed previously, this difference is innocuous) and that once a coalition has been
formed it does not leave the game, so it can be part of another future merger. This last
difference is shown to be crucial.
In this framework, the set of SPE outcomes (as well as the set of stationary SPE
outcomes) is quite large. In particular, monopoly can be sustained as a SPE outcome. In-
deed, suppose that, when πt is “all singletons”, each player’s strategy prescribes accepting
an offer if and only if Z = π1 and proposing Z = π1 if he has been chosen by the protocol.
Also, players follow any SPE strategy profile in those subgames where at least one merger
has already taken place. One can prove, by using the one-stage deviation principle,12
that the previous profile is an SPE whose outcome is monopoly, independently of the
discount rate. However, many other coalition structures are also SPE outcomes for every
discount rate. For instance, take S ⊂ N such that s ≥ s∗, where s∗ is the minimum size of
any profitable coalition, defined by Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) that represents
about 80% of the market. Consider strategies where, when πt is “all singletons”, the
players in S accept any offer involving at least s players, and propose Z = S if they are
selected by the protocol, while players outside S never accept nor offer any merger, and
complete the profile by taking any SPE profile for the remaining subgames. This profile
12For a formal statement of this principle see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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also constitutes an SPE that yields a coalition structure with a coalition of s players and
(n − s) singletons. For the particular case when s = s∗, this is precisely the outcome of
the game proposed by Bloch (1996).
Many equilibrium profiles that induce more than one merger can also be devised. In
particular, any duopoly in which the size of the smallest coalition is less than (4/9)n (so
that the members of this coalition are better off in duopoly than in monopoly) can be
sustained by SPE strategies if δ is high enough. The SPE profile will be such that the
small coalition is formed first, and then the big coalition forms. Clearly, similar arguments
allow more complex coalition structures.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.b)We prove that the sequenceM constructed in part a) of the proof
of Lemma 1 belongs toM when n is large enough. We do the proof by induction over
r. For each r, we provide conditions over n under which the two “candidate” coalitions
Sra and S
r
b satisfy min{sra, srb} ≥ sr. Note that, since the minimum size of a coalition is 1,
when sr = 1, the previous condition imposes no restriction on the size of the coalitions.
This is the case if
int
½
4n
(r + 1)2
¾
= 0, i.e., r > rmax(n) ≡
√
4n− 1.
Therefore, we concentrate on r ∈ [2, rmax(n)].
(r = 2) min{s2a, s2b} ≥ s2 holds if and only if s2 ≥ s2, that is s1 = n ≥ 2s2, i.e.,
n ≥ 2
µ
int
½
4n
9
¾
+ 1
¶
.
A sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is n ≥ 18.
(r = 3) The condition min{s3a, s3b} ≥ s3 is always satisfied if:
s2a − 1
2
≥ s3, i.e., n−
µ
int
½
4n
9
¾
+ 1
¶
− 1 ≥ 2
³
int
nn
4
o
+ 1
´
.
It can be shown that the above inequality holds as soon as n is large enough.
For any r ≥ 4, the sizes of the coalitions Sra and Srb (which are as equal as possible)
sum up to the size of the largest coalition in πr−1. Since the size of such a coalition is at
least n
r−1 , we have that min{sra, srb} ≥
n
r−1−1
2
. Therefore,
min{sra, srb} ≥ sr if
n
r − 1 − 1 ≥ 2
µ
int
½
4n
(r + 1)2
¾
+ 1
¶
.
This inequality holds if:
f(r) ≡ 3 (r + 1)
2 (r − 1)
(r − 3)2
≤ n.
Since the function f(r) is first decreasing (from r = 4 on) and then increasing, the
previous inequality holds for all relevant r if it is satisfied at the extreme values r = 4
and r = rmax(n). It can be shown that this happens as long as n is large enough.
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Figure 1: Outline of the Sequence of Moves 
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